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Oral Presentation 1.1
OF "MICE" AND MEN
A CRITICISM OF JERRY FODOR'S THEORY OF MENTAL CONTENT

C.J. Summers, Leonard Clapp, Department of Philosophy, IWU
Jerry Fodor is currently one of the top philosophers of mind. One of his main
projects is the attempt to naturalize the intentionality of our mental states.
Intentionality is roughly cashed out in terms of belief/desire psychology, the
theory that humans have beliefs and desires with semantic content or
meaning, and that these beliefs and desires are more or less the cause of their
actions. The supposition that our mental states have meaning seems in
tension with a physicalist ontology, which includes only natural, syntactic
objects. It is unclear how neurons or chemicals can have meaning in the way
that our mental states appear to be meaningful. Fodor attempts to provide an
account of the Intentionality of our mental states which reduces this meaning
to purely physical, syntactic entities. If he were successful then he could
retain a belief in intentional mental content while remaining a strict
physicalist.
The two tools which are available to a physicalist are physical objects and
relationships between physical obj ects. Fodor constructs a theory which
equates the meaning of a mental state with the causal relationships it bears
to obj ects in the world. His theory, however, does not succeed as an
explanation of meaning because it fails to distinguish meaningful situations
from non-meaningful. It therefore falls to pansemanticism, the assignment of
meaning to objects, such as smoke, which obviously are not meaningful in the
same way as our mental states. Furthermore, given the complexity of
relationships in the non-meaningful world it appears likely that a
pansemantic counter-example win exist for any theory which attempts to
reduce meaning to relationships.

